Politics Behind the Scenes in Western Political Life

Dionis L. Kaptar Writer and publicist, Moscow, Russia Keywords: Propaganda Due; P2; Licio Gelli; Operation Gladio For citation: Kaptar, D. L. "Politics Behind the Scenes in Western Political Life." Humanities and Social Sciences: Bulletin of the Financial University 13, no. 5 (2023): 114-120. https://doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2023-13-5-114-120 © Dionis L. Kaptar, 2023

Silvio Berlusconi, who served four terms as Italy's prime minister, died on 12 June 2023. He had been sentenced to prison several times, and his name had repeatedly surfaced in scandals that damaged his political career. This article, however, concerns events long predating the 1994 founding of Forza Italia, the party he led. A scandal in the early 1980s again raised questions about power exercised out of public view and about organisations that operated largely beyond public scrutiny yet may have been capable of shaping political events. The subject attracts a great deal of speculation, much of it plainly fanciful and unsupported; such claims are rightly rejected as unscientific. The case of Propaganda Due (P2), the Masonic lodge to which Berlusconi belonged, was different: it drew the attention of the Italian authorities.

In 1981, the government of Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani resigned after a major scandal involving P2. The story of the lodge begins with Freemasonry itself.

There are many theories about its origins. Some are essentially legends, reaching back to remote antiquity, biblical times or the classical world. Freemasonry has been linked to the Crusaders, the Knights Templar, the Druids and the collegia, or associations, of ancient Rome. The most convincing explanation, in my view, is that modern Freemasonry grew out of the medieval guilds of builders, a lineage reflected in the term "freemason" itself. The Masonic degrees of master, fellow craft and apprentice probably derive from the hierarchy of those guilds.

Guilds once wielded considerable economic and political influence. Their position weakened in the early modern period, and the stonemasons' guild gradually changed with it. An association of craftsmen eventually became an organisation embracing people from different occupations and social strata. In 1670, for example, the Aberdeen Masonic lodge "had 49 members, only 10 of whom were working stonemasons" [1].

Masonic fraternities that still undertook building work in the seventeenth century needed capital. Money therefore became a decisive consideration when men from outside the trade began to be admitted [2]. Freethinkers and members of the aristocracy joined the lodges for different reasons: the former saw a means of spreading their ideas, while the latter were drawn by the legends surrounding the brotherhood's past [2].

The Grand Lodge of London and Westminster was founded in 1717. The 2nd Duke of Montagu became its head in 1721, followed by the 1st Duke of Wharton in 1723, the 2nd Duke of Richmond in 1724, Lord Paisley in 1725 and the Earl of Inchiquin in 1726. Later leaders also came from the titled elite. They included the Prince of Wales, who would become King George IV, and Prince Augustus Frederick, a son of George III.

The historian Sergei Kiyasov writes that the active supporters of a controlled liberalisation of government institutions and of the broader system of social and political relations in the second half of the eighteenth century included "Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, Catherine II the Great, Gustav III of Sweden and many other European rulers who sincerely hoped to see the principles of the 'citizen-king' prevail. Influenced by theories that seemed both attractive and progressive, they counted the institutions of 'new' Freemasonry among their ideological allies and even lent them support through their personal participation" [3]. This was one of several factors that helped Freemasonry spread.

Eugène de Beauharnais played an important part in the establishment of a grand lodge in Italy. He took charge of the Grand Orient of Italy in 1805. P2's history began in 1877, when the Grand Master of the Grand Orient founded the Propaganda Massonica lodge. Freemasonry was banned in Italy in 1925, but regained legal status after the Second World War, and Propaganda Massonica was renamed Propaganda Due. The businessman Licio Gelli took over the lodge in 1975.

Long before taking charge of P2, Gelli had fought for Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War as a member of a Blackshirt battalion. In 1942, while serving as an inspector for the National Fascist Party, he was involved in transferring to Italy the treasures of King Peter II Karađorđević of Yugoslavia. Gelli spent three post-war years in hiding in Argentina [4, p. 104].

Many Nazis are known to have escaped justice in Latin America. Gelli helped to establish a ratline1 and assisted Klaus Barbie, the "Butcher of Lyon", in his escape [5, p. 109]. Barbie eventually stood trial in 1987. Gelli never held senior public office. For several years he worked as a chauffeur and secretary to a member of the Italian parliament. On the parliamentarian's recommendation, he became manager of one of Permaflex's plants. He later headed the personnel department at the Lebole factory and soon afterwards founded the Giole company with Mario and Giovanni [4, p. 106].

His Masonic career began with an application for admission in 1963. He joined Lodge No. 182, became a Fellow Craft in P2 in 1966 and, in 1971, was appointed to the senior position of organisational secretary of P2 by a circular signed by Lino Salvini, Grand Master of the Grand Orient of Italy [4, p. 107].

"Licio Gelli's connections were expanding. Nor did he lose touch with old associates, among them Stefano Delle Chiaie, Pierluigi Pagliani and Joachim Fiebelkorn, commanders in the private army set up in Bolivia by Klaus Barbie, the former head of the Lyon Gestapo, and known as the 'Fiancés of Death'" [5, p. 113].

Applications to join the lodge rose sharply. Gelli himself described it as a centre for international political mediation [4, p. 110]. His fortunes then collapsed just as quickly. The scandal that cost Arnaldo Forlani the premiership also ended Gelli's career. The trail that led to the P2 scandal began with the banker Michele Sindona.

Sindona was born in Sicily in 1920 and graduated in law from the University of Messina in 1942. The Allied landings in Sicily followed in 1943, after which a military government was established on the island. Its members included Charles Poletti, a former governor of New York. A first-generation American who knew both the Italian language and Italian culture, Poletti was well suited to the post. It was alleged that he knew Vito Genovese, a mafioso involved in black-market trading, and attempts were also made to link him to Lucky Luciano. Poletti denied the claims.

Sindona, meanwhile, established contacts with Sicily's new authorities, sold wheat on the black market and was known to Luciano [6, p. 24]. None of this, by itself, proves that Poletti was involved in illicit dealings. Sindona's rise, however, did owe much to Luciano, who enlisted him in laundering Mafia money [6, p. 25]. Why would a Mafia boss entrust such sensitive work to Sindona? His unusual background helps explain it. Sindona straddled two worlds: he was a well-educated lawyer, but also a black-market operator. That combination was unusual. Both men were Sicilian, a connection that carried weight in local circles.

In 1946, Sindona moved to Milan and opened a tax consultancy. He became a highly skilled accountant with expertise in moving capital abroad and using offshore structures. Among his clients was the senior mafioso Joe Adonis, who had ties both to Luciano and to the Genovese family. Sindona also met Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI.

His business interests continued to grow. He controlled several banks and companies in sectors ranging from hotels and construction to the manufacture of chocolate and porcelain. Sindona traded currencies internationally and acquired a controlling interest in Franklin National Bank, then one of the largest banks in the United States.

Yet his businesses showed signs of trouble. Several companies came close to bankruptcy and were sold. In 1971, an inspection by the Bank of Italy found breaches of the law in the operations of two Sindona banks. One was declared insolvent in 1974, and Sindona was suspected of fraudulent bankruptcy. Franklin National Bank also failed that year. Sindona came under investigation in the United States and, in 1980, received a 25-year prison sentence. He was convicted on dozens of counts, including perjury, fraud and the misappropriation of bank funds.

In 1981, the Italian authorities searched Villa Wanda, the home of a friend of Sindona's, on the assumption that Sindona had hidden documents there relating to the illegal export of currency. The search uncovered P2 membership lists, classified government papers and confidential intelligence files on prominent politicians [6, p. 12].

The villa belonged to Licio Gelli, bringing the investigation back to him.

The list contained a striking number of influential names: army generals, naval admirals, senior officers of the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri, intelligence chiefs, parliamentarians, business figures and professors. Vittorio Emanuele of Savoy, the son of Italy's last king, appeared on it, as did the prominent businessman Silvio Berlusconi. "P2 also had 'its people' among the largest publishers, the directors of television and radio programmes, journalists, sociologists and leading cultural figures. The lodge controlled, for example, the influential Rizzoli publishing house and Italy's largest newspaper, Corriere della Sera, as well as the Milan magazine Settimanale and the pro-Fascist weekly Borghese" [6, p. 13].

The list soon became public. On 26 May 1981, the government, including Prime Minister Forlani, resigned. A day later, Rome's public prosecutor, Domenico Sica, issued a warrant for Gelli's arrest on charges of "political espionage" and forming a "criminal organisation" [6, p. 14].

Gelli remained beyond the reach of Italian justice for a long time. He was arrested in Switzerland but escaped from prison and, according to some accounts, spent a period in South America. The lodge's list included several prominent Argentines who had held senior public posts at different times. In 1987 Gelli settled in Switzerland; the following year, Switzerland agreed to extradite him to Italy. He was tried and sentenced to 18 years in prison for fraud connected with the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano.

The bank's principal shareholder was the Institute for the Works of Religion, an institution of the Roman Curia that performs banking functions for the Holy See. An appellate court reduced Gelli's sentence to 12 years. The Court of Cassation upheld the conviction in 1998, whereupon he absconded from house arrest. He was detained in France and, from 2001 until his death in 2015, remained under house arrest at Villa Wanda.

Gelli was also suspected of involvement in the death of the banker Roberto Calvi, whose body was found in London in 1982. A sheet of paper in his pockets bore several names, including P2 members and other prominent figures. Gelli was formally charged, but his name did not appear in the final indictment.

The parliamentary commission investigating P2 also examined events surrounding an attempted coup in 1970, and Gelli's name surfaced there as well. The episode became known as the Golpe Borghese, or Borghese coup, after its leader, Prince Junio Valerio Borghese, a member of an aristocratic family.

Borghese had fought for Franco in the Spanish Civil War as a submarine commander. During the Second World War he first commanded the submarines Vettor Pisani and Scirè. In 1943 he took command of the Decima Flottiglia MAS, a naval infantry formation of the Italian Social Republic2. After the war he stood trial on suspicion of involvement in the execution of Italian partisans.

He received a 12-year prison sentence but was granted an amnesty in 1949. In 1951 he became president of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement. He founded the neo-Fascist National Front in 1968 and began preparing a military coup the following year.

The putsch began on the night of 7-8 December 1970. Militants led by Stefano Delle Chiaie entered the Ministry of the Interior. "The Blackshirts enter the armoury and begin carrying automatic weapons to a waiting lorry; they set up heavy machine guns on the stairways. The veteran Fascists Stefano Delle Chiaie and Sandro Saccucci urge their men on: 'Hurry! Hurry! It's about to begin!'" [6, p. 52]. The conspirators also moved into action in Venice, Verona, Lombardy, Umbria and Tuscany.

Then an order from Borghese abruptly halted the coup. The public did not learn of the attempt until 17 March 1971. On 18 March, Rome's deputy public prosecutor issued arrest warrants for several people, including Borghese, but he had already fled to Spain. Borghese died in 1974 without publicly disclosing why he had called off the coup. In 1988, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Terrorism in Italy and the Reasons Why Those Responsible for Massacres Had Not Been Identified considered several possible explanations, but did not claim to have established conclusively why he stopped the operation.

Its report contains a rather vague indication that the order came from Licio Gelli. Several people associated with the coup were P2 members: "not only Saccucci, but also Remo Orlandini, the 'Black Prince's' right-hand man; police captain Salvatore Drago, who opened the doors of the Interior Ministry to the putschists; and General Vito Miceli, head of SID - all were Freemasons. More than that, they were members of the secret P2 lodge" [6, p. 53]. SID was Italy's intelligence service from 1966 to 1977. Miceli took charge in 1970 and remained in the post for several years.

Another scandal erupted in 1990, this time over the organisation known as Gladio and the operation of the same name. The revelations brought Gelli and P2 back into view.

"The US-funded anti-communist 'parallel' government P2 and the secret Gladio units worked closely together during the First Republic. After P2 was exposed, Licio Gelli escaped arrest and left for South America. At the end of the Cold War, he readily confirmed that the secret army had been recruited from committed anti-communists," writes the historian Daniele Ganser [7, p. 94].

The name Gladio comes from gladius, the sword carried by Roman legionaries. The organisation itself dates back to the 1950s. Western planners considering a hypothetical war with the Soviet Union allowed for the possibility that the Soviet Army might occupy large areas. In that event, clandestine forces were to conduct sabotage behind Soviet lines.

Weapons caches were prepared and personnel recruited and trained. Networks of paramilitary cells appeared in several countries of the Western bloc. The Italian network was called Gladio. Its counterparts elsewhere had different names, although "Gladio" became an informal generic term for such networks. Similar organisations are reported to have existed at least in France, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Greece and Switzerland.

The entire programme remained secret, known only to a small circle. Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy from 1985 to 1992, once remarked: "I am proud that we managed to keep everything secret for a full 45 years" [7, p. 26]. In 1990, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti formally acknowledged Gladio's existence. Italy is a parliamentary republic, yet until then its parliament had not known that the country had long been part of an agreement to establish a sabotage network on Italian soil.

How closely did the declared purpose - clandestine operations in the event of a hypothetical war with the Soviet Union - match the plans of Gladio's creators? Could it have been a cover for other purposes from the start? Western governments in the 1950s may well have been preparing in earnest to mount sabotage against Soviet forces, and may have continued to plan for it throughout the Cold War. But the networks also gave those who controlled them a means of exerting pressure on national governments. NATO helped to run Gladio, and the United States held, as it still holds, the dominant position within the alliance. Intelligence agencies were involved as well, above all the CIA. Suppose a Western European country had tried to loosen Washington's influence and pursue policies sharply at odds with American interests. Could the United States have responded through those clandestine networks? No government could be certain that it would not. The possibility alone offered leverage.

Could these networks in practice have been controlled by what I call unofficial centres of power, operating beyond public view? After the P2 scandal, it is hard to insist that such power has never existed, does not exist and could never exist. Some reports even claim that Gelli headed two lodges more secretive than P2. Nor is the issue limited to potential influence: did Gladio's operations directly affect events in particular countries?

For many years, the Red Brigades were blamed for the bombing at Peteano on 31 May 1972. According to the police report, the explosive used in the attack was the same type as that used by the Red Brigades. Judge Felice Casson later established that the falsified forensic findings had been supplied by Marco Morin, an explosives specialist with the Italian police and a member of the neo-Fascist group Ordine Nuovo [7, p. 13].

The car had been rigged with C4, an explosive used by NATO, among others. Early in 1972, before the Peteano bombing, police found a cache near Trieste containing C4, weapons and ammunition. By investigating the incidents in Trieste and Peteano, Casson established that the bombing had been carried out by Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a member of Ordine Nuovo [7, p. 14].

Vinciguerra later spoke of an unnamed structure: "In the absence of a Soviet occupation, which might never have happened, this immensely powerful organisation took it upon itself, on NATO's behalf, to prevent the country's political situation from shifting to the left. It did so in cooperation with the official intelligence services and the political and military authorities" [7, p. 18].

Andreotti maintained that applicants to Gladio were carefully vetted and could not belong to extremist organisations [7, p. 24]. If Vinciguerra was speaking about Gladio, however, a question remains: how did he know about it? Would it not be reasonable to suppose that he was a member?

Accounts of Gladio often mention Stefano Delle Chiaie. His name also surfaced in connection with the bombing at Bologna. "According to Elio Ciolini, a neo-Fascist follower of Gelli who had become disillusioned with his former idol, the mass killing was planned in detail at a P2 meeting in Monte Carlo on 11 April 1980, attended by Licio Gelli. Ciolini also testified under oath that operational command had been entrusted to the 'bloody trio' already mentioned: Stefano Delle Chiaie, Pierluigi Pagliani and Joachim Fiebelkorn" [5, p. 117]. Delle Chiaie has also been mentioned in connection with the Milan bombing, the Borghese coup, a series of train bombings in 1972 and the bombing of the Italicus Express. The courts, however, did not convict him of any offence in those cases or in the Bologna case. For that and other reasons, I am not prepared to claim that Gladio was in fact involved in terrorism.

Whatever the truth about Gladio's involvement in terrorism, the paramilitary network itself remained hidden for decades. If one such organisation could be created, what would prevent the same thing from happening again?

NOTES

1. Ratlines were routes used by Fascists to escape from Europe.
2. A German-backed puppet state that existed from 1943 to 1945 in German-occupied parts of Italy. REFERENCES
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dionis Leonidovich Kaptar - writer and publicist, Moscow, Russia https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9754-4378

original : https://humanities.fa.ru/jour/article/view/880/868