HaJ3FgupAm8RrDJW3MHgT9X7Ft27eVaD
Micah Lee: Hard-coded API token that Flock cameras use to identify themselves and get OAuth credentials, which can then be used to talk to Flock's production servers.
https://bsky.app/profile/micahflee.com/post/3mvo2dzx24c2v
28 Comments
faebudo@infosec.pub · 41 pts · 1d
They are always very specific when saying that Flock cameras do not do face recognition. Vecause stated like this it's true. The face recognition doesn't happen on the camera (also not license plate reading etc.) instead photos are sent to central servers where they do the license plate reading and face recognition.
Redvenom@retrolemmy.com · 26 pts · 1d
Just a random string of characters:
HaJ3FgupAm8RrDJW3MHgT9X7Ft27eVaD
victorz@lemmy.world · 10 pts · 1d
Is that the token?
Ah yes, yes it is.
wyldrstallyns@lemmy.dbzer0.com · 19 pts · 1d
Get it, freedom fighters! 🤘🏼✊🏼
markstos@lemmy.world · 18 pts · 1d
We are soon to find out if Flock blindly onboards random MAC addresses as new cameras.
If so, it seems anyone with the hardcoded key can authenticate with Flock ask if they were a new camera.
p03locke@lemmy.dbzer0.com · 5 pts · 10h
And it doesn't have to be a camera. It can just be a random set of images.
yakko@feddit.uk · 2 pts · 4h
It can be
Gasp
Can it pretend to be information about me, but then instead it's all butt holes?
Quexotic@sh.itjust.works · 2 pts · 3h
¿Porque no los dos?
yakko@feddit.uk · 3 pts · 3h
Because mine is secretive 😶
muusemuuse@sh.itjust.works · 4 pts · 3h
I wonder if that means you could “claim” a bunch of MAC addresses so you can block deployment of new or replacement flock cameras.
derry@midwest.social · 16 pts · 1d
Keeps getting better
jtrek@startrek.website · 13 pts · 1d
I wonder if this was a form of sabotage by an engineer, or regular incompetence
leftzero@lemmy.dbzer0.com · 2 pts · 2h
Hanlon's razor:
But, also, Grey's law:
ComradePenguin@lemmy.ml · 2 pts · 2h
I'd like to live in a world in which the former is the case, but as an engineer I have seen some shit
ilovededyoupiggy@sh.itjust.works · 10 pts · 10h
I'm going to go as a functional Flock camera for Halloween.
mp3@lemmy.ca · 3 pts · 9h
damn that's good
moldy_rice@piefed.keyboardvagabond.com · 7 pts · 9h
Why are you linking to bluesky instead of his article?
lka1988@sh.itjust.works · 6 pts · 1d
Lmao
Quexotic@sh.itjust.works · 5 pts · 3h
If you think for about two seconds about the national security implications about this, this is extremely, extremely bad.
victorz@lemmy.world · 3 pts · 1d
Quick question: what would be the correct way to handle this, security wise? How should they acquire their token if it isn't present on-device?
I mean, each device could have its own token, but you could still sniff it, maybe? I dunno.
How should Flock have gone about this if working to their own self-interest?
dejected_warp_core@lemmy.world · 16 pts · 1d
Ethically? Expire the token since it's compromised, and offer to refurbish all units in the field since flock screwed up, a now all customer data could be poisoned/suspect now.
Realistically? Keep going like nothing happened an make it a customer support problem while pushing new hardened cameras that cost more. Because the product alone loudly flags Flock as a bunch of amoral greedy fuckwits.
I won't suggest ways to actually make their product bulletproof because I care and we don't need to make this problem worse for everyone. It is a tantilizing problem space but there are never any perfect answers in security, only relatively better/worse ones.
victorz@lemmy.world · 5 pts · 18h
Oh, I don't mean afterwards. I meant before it even happened.
mp3@lemmy.ca · 11 pts · 1d
One way would be to generate a unique private key on the secure element / TPM and its public key stored on the server for validation. Each API request would need to be signed with a relatively short expiration time. That way the code never contains sensitive content such as an API key, an exploited device only holds in RAM a signed certificate that is valid for a short period of time, and the certificate can be revoked/blocklisted on the server if compromised.
kibiz0r@midwest.social · 7 pts · 1d
Unique private key per device, pre-provisioned certificate at manufacturing time, hardware-level separation of crypto operations so sensitive creds are never in memory.
It’s a bit more expensive to manufacture, in terms of BOM and logistics. And then you have a lot more complexity to your production system too.
victorz@lemmy.world · 1 pts · 6h
Is it possible to have several private keys per singleton public key?
multiplemigs@sh.itjust.works · -1 pts · 4h
y'all just givin the work away huh? don't answer this unless you are getting paid.
victorz@lemmy.world · 2 pts · 2h
O... Kay, I'm just trying to expand my knowledge about this particular case. I'm mostly a web dev but I'm trying to expand into security a little bit as well because I think that's important for my field. It just wasn't a part of my curriculum at uni 10–20 years ago.
multiplemigs@sh.itjust.works · 1 pts · 1h
i was mostly joking 🙃 sorry if it came across as rude